Restoring Mind-Brain Supervenience: A Proposal :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

Restoring Mind-Brain Supervenience: A Proposal ABSTRACT: In this paper I examine the claim that mental causation — at least for cases involving the production of purposive behavior — is possible only if ‘mind/brain supervenience’ obtains, and suggest that in spite of all the bad press it has received in recent years, mind/brain supervenience is still the best way for a physicalist to solve the ‘exclusion problem’ that plagues many accounts of mental causation. In section 3, I introduce a form of mind/brain supervenience that depends crucially on the idea that some brain state-types-namely, those involved in the production of purposive behavior-are nonlocally sensitive, where by ‘nonlocal sensitivity’ I mean cases where relevant causal histories and environmental circumstances effect a difference in some of an organism’s brain state-types intrinsic, causal properties. I will argue that such a mode of sensitivity of brain state-types offers the best way out of the exclusio n problem for anyone convinced that mental state-types should be relationally individuated. I In what follows, I examine the claim that mental causation—at least for cases involving the production of purposive behavior—is possible only if ‘mind/brain supervenience’ obtains, and suggest that in spite of all the bad press it has received in recent years, mind/brain supervenience still is the best way for a physicalist to solve the ‘exclusion problem’ that plagues many accounts of mental causation. In section III, I introduce a form of mind/brain supervenience that depends crucially on the idea that some brain state-types—namely, those involved in the production of purposive behavior—are nonlocally sensitive, where by ‘nonlocal sensitivity’ I understand cases where relevant causal histories and environmental circumstances effect a difference in some of an organism’s brain state-types’ intrinsic, causal properties, and argue that such a mode of sensitivity of brain state-types offers the best way out of the exclusion problem for anyone convinced that mental state-types should be relationally individuated. (1) It is important to notice from the outset that nonlocal sensitivity, as I understand it, is not equivalent to relational individuation. Indeed, I am not claiming that a change in a brain state-type’s relational properties effects a difference in its intrinsic, causal properties. I agree that brain state-types should be individuated nonrelationally, but introduce ‘local’ and ‘nonlocal’ sensitivity as modes of nonrelational individuation of brain state-types, and argue that nonlocally sensitive brain state-types make up the proper subvenient base for mental state-types. If my view is correct, strong mind/brain supervenience is restored, and the exclusion problem solved.